

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
ROUTING SLIP

21 MAY 1985
LOC-3
LEG-3

TO:

		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		X		
2	DDCI		X		
3	EXDIR		X		
4	D/ICS	1	X		
5	DDI		X		
6	DDA		X		
7	DDO		X		
8	DDS&T		X		
9	Chm/NIC				
10	GC				
11	IG				
12	Compt				
13	D/Pers				
14	D/OLL				
15	D/PAO				
16	SA/IA				
17	AO/DCI				
18	C/IPD/OIS				
19	NIO /S&T		X		
20	C/TTIC		X		
21	C/TTAC		X		
22					
SUSPENSE		Date			

Remarks

FYI, Current Draft NSDD on this subject is dated 30 April 85, sent to your office on 1 May 85. DDI Action, ER 1765-85.

STAT

Executive Secretary
17 May 85

Date

3637 (10-81)

The Johns Hopkins University



Steven Muller, President

Executive Registry

85- 1940/2

May 14, 1985

Director William J. Casey
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Director Casey:

Please let me express my full support of the enclosed draft of the National Policy on the Transfer of Scientific and Technical Information which has been proposed by an interagency working group. As you know, The Johns Hopkins University is extremely active in many fields of research, and I am continually impressed when I listen to faculty discussions about how vital free exchange of information is to progress in many scientific fields. Research is not, and cannot be, isolated, and many ground-breaking steps are conceived in dialogue with scholars who do not happen to be citizens of the United States.

I am of course aware of the potential threat to national security involved in the dissemination of information concerning some technical advancements, but am firmly convinced that each federal government agency must be responsible for determining whether classification is warranted prior to the award of a research grant or contract. The enclosed draft statement provides an appropriate balance of these concerns and I strongly encourage you to support it.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Steven Muller".

SM:cs
Enclosure

Garland Hall
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NATIONAL POLICY ON THE TRANSFER OF SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL INFORMATION

(Draft of June 15, 1984)

I. PURPOSE

This directive establishes national policy for controlling the flow of science and technology information produced in fundamental research at colleges, universities, and laboratories under contract to U.S. government agencies.

II. BACKGROUND

The acquisition of advanced technology from the United States by Eastern Bloc nations for the purpose of enhancing their military capabilities poses a significant threat to our national security. Intelligence studies indicate a small but significant target of the Eastern Bloc intelligence gathering effort is science and engineering research performed at universities and federal laboratories. At the same time, our leadership position in science and technology is an essential element in our economic and physical security. The strength of American science requires a research environment conducive to creativity, an environment in which the free exchange of ideas is a vital component.

In 1982, the Department of Defense and National Science Foundation sponsored a National Academy of Sciences study of the need for controls on scientific information. This study was chaired by Dr. Dale Corson, President Emeritus of Cornell University. It concluded that, while there has been a significant transfer of U.S. technology to the Soviet Union, the transfer has occurred through many routes with universities and open scientific communication of fundamental research being a minor contributor. Yet as the emerging government-university-industry partnership in research activities continues to grow, a more significant problem may well develop.

III. POLICY STATEMENT

It is the policy of this administration that the mechanism for control of fundamental research in science and engineering at colleges, universities and laboratories under contract to U.S. Government Agencies is classification. Consistency of this policy with applicable U.S. Statutes must be maintained. Each federal government agency is responsible for: a) determining whether classification is appropriate prior to the award of a research grant or contract and, if so, controlling the research results through standard classification procedures; b) periodically reviewing all research grants or contracts for potential classification. No restrictions may be placed upon the conduct or reporting of fundamental research that has not received national security classification.